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INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the United States’ entry into the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), there is considerable confusion as to 
just what legal effect the agreement will have. In written answers to 
Senator Ron Wyden, the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) went to lengths to describe ACTA as non-binding, 
asserting that “ACTA does not constrain Congress’ authority to 
change U.S. law,” and that it would operate only as an “Executive 
 
* Professorial Lecturer & Associate Director, Program on Information 
Justice and Intellectual Property, American University Washington College of 
Law, Sflynn@wcl.american.edu, 202-274-4157. Thanks to Oona Hathaway, Amy 
Kapczynski, Peter Yu, Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, David Levine and Chris 
Sprigman for many helpful comments and discussions. Thanks to Jimmy Koo and 
Cameron Chong for their stellar research assistance. Errors are, of course, my own. 
A version of the arguments canvassed in this article was submitted to USTR in a 
statement signed by 30 law professors, available at http://infojustice.org/ 
rchives/1166.  
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Agreement” that “can be implemented without new legislation.”1 But 
European negotiators have described the agreement to their 
legislature in very different terms, asserting that ACTA is “a binding 
international agreement on all its parties, as defined and subject to 
the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).”2 
ACTA is not a binding international agreement under U.S. law. 
The U.S. Constitution describes a limited number of ways in which 
the United States can be bound to international law. The subjects of 
ACTA—the regulation of intellectual property and domestic and 
foreign commerce—are Article I powers under the U.S. Constitution, 
meaning they can be regulated only with congressional participation. 
Yet, according to the USTR, ACTA will be entered by the United 
States as a sole executive agreement without congressional 
authorization or approval. Because the entry of ACTA unilaterally 
exceeds the President’s constitutional authority, ACTA cannot bind 
U.S. law. The statements of the USTR as described above are thus 
correct: ACTA cannot change, or prevent the change of, U.S. law. 
Under international law ACTA is a treaty. Customary international 
law recognizes the right of every state to bind itself to international 
law through the consent of its executive. If the President or a 
delegate signs ACTA without reservations—that is, if he expresses 
the intent of the United States to be bound—then the lack of 
congressional approval is unlikely to prevent the agreement from 
being binding under international law. The lack of constitutional 
authority of the executive to enter ACTA on its own accord may not 
prevent the United States from being bound. ACTA will thus be a 
treaty under international law, although not a treaty under U.S. 
domestic law.  
This article explains these points in more depth. Part I gives a brief 
 
 1. James Love, US Congress Is Not Bound by ACTA, According to White 
House Answers to Senate Finance on ACTA and TPP Negotiations, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1115. 
 2. James Love, Greens/EFA MEPs Engström, Sargentini, Beliér, Albrecht Ask 
Question on ACTA and Vienna Convention, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 
10, 2011, 7:22 AM), http://keionline.org/node/1077 (explaining that the United 
States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, but accepts its terms as 
describing applicable and binding principles of customary international law). See 
generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (2nd ed. 2008). 
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background of ACTA and its mandatory framework for minimum 
legislative standards that would alternatively pledge the United 
States to change, or to rigidly maintain, current U.S. law. Part II 
explains the U.S. Constitutional requirements for entry into binding 
international agreements and shows how the current plan for entering 
ACTA fails to abide by those norms. Part III describes the 
international law on treaty-making, which would render ACTA a 
binding international treaty even absent congressional consent. The 
article concludes with a few thoughts on why this state of affairs is a 
problem from the perspective of good governance and democratic 
accountability. 
I. ACTA AND THE ENFORCEMENT AGENDA  
As we mark the 15th anniversary of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”),3 international intellectual property law is 
being shaped by an “enforcement agenda.”4 In its simplest terms, the 
enforcement agenda represents a shift of the efforts of multinational 
intellectual property holders and their allied governments from a goal 
of escalating substantive intellectual property requirements in global 
legislation, to a focus on lowering the costs and raising the penalties 
for the enforcement of existing rights. But this simple description 
masks the agenda’s primary goal, which is to shift a higher 
percentage of intellectual property enforcement costs toward the 
public. The enforcement agenda promotes expanding the public’s 
role in enforcement through criminalization and other forms of 
public prosecution; expanded use of border searches and seizures; 
sponsorship of publicly funded education and technical assistance 
campaigns; creation of new government “IP Czars” and other 
specialized government offices, task forces and courts; and 
increasing coordination between enforcement agencies and private 
 
 3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299. 
 4. Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 3 (Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual 
Prop. (“PIJIP”), Working Paper No. 15, 2010), available at http://digital 
commons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=research. 
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industry. At the same time, its measures seek to decrease the cost and 
improve the “deterrent” efficacy of private enforcement through 
minimizing due process rights of those accused of infringement; 
escalating penalties for infringement, including for end users of 
infringing products; and extending liability to third party platforms 
and intermediaries that are easier to find and litigate against and 
which potentially cut off larger collections of accused infringers.5  
The crafting of the enforcement agenda began in multilateral 
forums, including the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) and the WTO.6 But in these institutions the enforcement 
agenda quickly stalled.7 WIPO is focused instead on the elaboration 
of a “development agenda,”8 and the WTO has become a key forum 
for developing countries to challenge the legality and potential ill 
effects of the agenda.9   
 
 5. See SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING 
ECONOMIES 19–29 (Joe Karaganis ed. 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/50196972/MPEE-1-0-1; Sell, supra note 4, at 6–16; Margot E. Kaminski, An 
Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
(PIJIP, Working Paper No. 17, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl. 
american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=research.   
 6. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Gen. Assembly, Rep. on the 
Twenty-Eighth (13th Extraordinary) Sess., 19-26, WO/GA/28/7 (Oct. 1, 2002) 
(chronicling the discussion on the establishment of the WIPO Advisory Committee 
on Enforcement); see also Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of 
ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 11 n.54 (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.ssrn. 
com/abstract=1624813 (describing ten WTO TRIPS Council documents related to 
the review of TRIPS-related national laws).   
 7. See SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 81; Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits of Harmonization, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 596, 603 (2006) (referencing stalled negotiations on upward 
harmonization in WIPO and other international agencies).  
 8. See Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011); The 45 
Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., ¶ 15, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recom 
mendations.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (recommending that international 
intellectual property norm setting processes “be inclusive” and “be a participatory 
process, which takes into consideration the interests and priorities of all WIPO 
Member States and the viewpoints of other stakeholders, including accredited 
inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs”). See generally 
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Jeremy DeBeer ed. 2009). 
 9. See Intervention by India to the WTO TRIPS Council, SOUTH CENTRE (June 
9, 2010),  http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
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The rejection of the enforcement agenda at the multilateral level 
led to a regime shift into unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral 
processes in which formal participation by strong developing country 
coalitions are excluded and openness to public observation and input 
are highly restricted. For the last several years, ACTA has been the 
center of these efforts.10 
The negotiation process for ACTA has been a case study in 
establishing the conditions for effective industry capture of a 
lawmaking process.11 Instead of using the relatively transparent and 
inclusive multilateral processes, ACTA was launched through a 
closed and secretive “‘club approach’ in which like-minded 
jurisdictions define enforcement ‘membership’ rules and then invite 
other countries to join, presumably via other trade agreements.”12 
 
article&id=1354 (critiquing "the multitude of initiatives launched by a group of 
largely developed country Members to enforce TRIPS Agreement in a manner that 
is considerably more extensive than the level enshrined in TRIPS Agreement"); 
Intervention by Brazil - TRIPS Council, INTELL. PROP. WATCH BLOG (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Brazil-onTRIPS-
Enforcement-Trends.doc (objecting to the creation of enforcement norms outside 
of multilateral channels through the ACTA negotiations).  
 10.  See Peter K. Yu, supra note 6, at 4-15. 
 11.  For canonical work on the theme of regulatory capture in U.S. regulatory 
environments, and the link to lack of adequate public participation avenues, see 
generally WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATION (1983); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened 
Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); 
Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 
359 (1972); Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade 
Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777 (1971); Nicholas Johnson, A New Fidelity to the 
Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869 (1971); Arthur E. Bonfield, Public 
Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, 
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970) . 
 12.  See Daniel Gervais, International Decision: China—Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT‘L 
L. 549, 555 (2009); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 
301 REPORT 4 (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (explaining that ACTA is designed to strengthen 
intellectual property rights through the creation of global enforcement standards); 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV. N.Z., 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____34357.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that ACTA sets a high goal for intellectual property 
rights enforcement); Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement. (2007), WIKILEAKS, available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/ACTA-discussion-paper-1.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) 
(proposing “[s]pecial measures for developing countries in the initial phase”). 
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The most influential developing countries, including Brazil, India, 
China and Russia, were excluded.13 Likewise, a series of maneuvers 
ensured that public knowledge about the specifics of the agreement 
and opportunities for input into the process were severely limited. 
Negotiations were held with mere hours notice to the public as to 
when and where they would be convened, often in countries half 
away around the world from where public interest groups are housed. 
Once there, all negotiation processes were closed to the public. Draft 
texts were not released before or after most negotiating rounds, and 
meetings with stakeholders took place only behind closed doors and 
off the record.14 A public release of draft text, in April 2010, was 
followed by no public or on-the-record meetings with negotiators. 
The only notice and comment process on ACTA text in the United 
States was invited after the negotiation was declared to be fully 
completed.15 USTR officials themselves described the agency’s goal 
 
 13. ACTA is a proposed multilateral international agreement between 
Australia, Canada, the 27 countries of the European Union (E.U.), Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States of 
America. ACTA Fact Sheet (March 2010), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010 (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2011). Using Immanuel Wallerstein’s “World Systems” typology, all but 
two of the negotiating countries are part of the high income and highly 
industrialized “core” of the world system. Two countries, Mexico and Morocco, 
are part of the second tier of middle income rapidly industrializing countries. The 
majority of the world’s countries and population centers located in the periphery of 
the world system are not represented at all. This has lead to the criticism that the 
ACTA negotiations have disregarded the interests of developing countries that 
could be greatly affected by the agreement. Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Globalization or the Age of Transition?: A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of 
the World System, 15 INT'L SOC. 249, 265 (2000) (arguing that the world is 
generally divided into two camps, the stronger of which will work to continue the 
status quo of an inegalitarian system in order to maintain their power and 
privileges); Emily Ayoob, Note, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 28 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 192 (2010) (“[O]ne of the most common and 
most serious criticisms of ACTA has been that developing countries have not been 
included in the negotiations and will later be forced, through other trade sanctions, 
to join an agreement in which they had no part in creating.”). 
 14.  See, e.g., ACTA Update, WASH. INT'L TRADE ASS'N (Oct. 29, 2010), 
http://www.wita.org/en/cev/1126 (advertising an event featuring USTR chief 
ACTA negotiator Kira Alvarez “appearing Off-The-Record”). There was, to this 
author’s knowledge, one on-the-record meeting of ACTA negotiators with public 
interest representatives—in Lucerne, Switzerland, Summer 2010. 
 15.  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Request for Comments From the 
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,069 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
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in responding to public calls for broader participation as the serving 
up of an opaque “transparency soup.”16  
This is a very different process of international lawmaking than 
would be the norm in multilateral processes like the WTO or WIPO. 
Jeremy Malcolm has identified three core elements of best practices 
for participation at the multilateral level that were absent from the 
ACTA negotiation and other forums in which the enforcement 
agenda is being negotiated. These include ongoing releases of 
negotiation texts and background materials to inform the public 
about the direction of the negotiation and its substantive proposals; 
institutionalized and regular briefings of civil society and the general 
public to afford meaningful opportunities to be heard on all aspects 
of policymaking; and access to the negotiation venue to observe 
proceedings and make responses to policy discussions.17  
Despite the opaque and non-participatory process used to negotiate 
the agreement, the potential domestic effects of ACTA are far-
reaching.  
The final text runs twenty-six single spaced pages, at least half of 
which create a new minimum “Legal Framework for Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights.”18 The Legal Framework chapter 
contains new “TRIPS-plus”19 requirements for minimum legislative 
 
 16. See James Love, USTR’s February 10, 2009 memo on Transparency Soup, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/ 
node/929 (referencing an internal Obama Administration email from the Assistant 
USTR for Intellectual Property and Innovation, Stanford McCoy, with the subject 
line “Transparency Soup,” offering a strategy for how USTR could respond to 
demands for more public access to ACTA negotiations).  
 17. Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy 
Institutions 19–21 (PIJIP, Research Paper No. 6, 2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&contex
t=research. 
 18. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, December 3, 2010 6–17 [hereinafter 
ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2010/december/tradoc_147079.pdf (containing eleven pages of text in 
Articles 6–27, which comprise “Chapter Two: Legal Framework for Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights”). 
 19. See, e.g., PEDRO ROFFE, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS 
WORLD: THE CHILE-USA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4-5 (2004), available at 
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/Bilateral-Agreements-and-
TRIPS-plus-English.pdf (using “TRIPS-plus” as an informal term to refer to 
minimum legal standards in national or international laws that exceed the baseline 
requirements of the TRIPS agreement); Peter K. Yu, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting 
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enactments covering all intellectual property rights currently 
contained in TRIPS.20 The specific doctrinal fields covered by ACTA 
thus include patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, 
geographical indications, layout-designs or topographies of 
integrated circuits, pharmaceutical and agricultural test data, and sui 
generis protection of plant varieties.21 In the United States, the 
coverage includes regulation at multiple jurisdictional levels, 
including fields like trade secrets and remedies that are often 
regulated by state law.22 The doctrines regulated by ACTA include 
those relating to injunctions, including ex parte preliminary 
injunctions;23 damages, including “pre-established” statutory 
damages;24 duties to divulge confidential information to the 
 
USTR negotiator Stanford McCoy as initiating ACTA negotiations to create a 
“TRIPS-plus” agreement that would “set a new standard for IPR enforcement that 
was better suited to contemporary challenges”). 
 20. See James Love, The October 2, 2010 version of the ACTA text, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Oct. 6, 2010, 7:13 AM), http://keionline.org/ 
node/962 [hereinafter Love, Oct. 2 version of ACTA] (defining intellectual property 
as “refer[ring] to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of 
Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of [TRIPS]”). All of the negotiating countries of 
ACTA are members of the World Trade Organization and therefore are also 
signatories to the WTO’s agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. See Members accepting amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_ 
e.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 2011) (listing all WTO members that approved the 
TRIPS agreement). Enforcement of intellectual property laws was a central 
concern of TRIPS, primarily expressed in Part III. ACTA is essentially a re-write 
of TRIPS Part III for its member countries to expand the amount of mandatory 
enforcement measures required. See James Love, ACTA and Part III of TRIPS 
Compared by Frequency of Terms, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 10, 2010, 
10:25 AM), http://keionline.org/node/940 (noting, for example, that the August 
leaked text of ACTA contained more than twice as many instances when the word 
“shall” was used to require action on enforcement issues). 
 21. See Love, Oct. 2 version of ACTA, supra note 20 (arguing that by the 
“broad inclusion” of a wide array of intellectual property rights, “ACTA creates 
unintended consequences . . . [because] some of [ACTA’s] enforcement provisions 
make no sense outside of the context of copyrights and trademarks”). 
 22. See Letter from Dana Eidsness, Dir., Forum on Democracy & Trade, to 
Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative (Nov. 22, 2010), available at 
http://forumdemocracy.net/downloads/2010%20Forum%20Letter%20to%20USTR
%20on%20ACTA.pdf (expressing concern about the breadth of topics covered by 
ACTA, which could preempt many areas of state law, including common law, 
without due consideration). 
 23. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, art. 8. 
 24. See id. art. 9 ¶ 3(a). 
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government;25 seizure and destruction of goods, both before and after 
determinations of violation;26 border searches and detentions;”27 
criminal liability, including infringements of copyright that bestow 
any “indirect economic or commercial advantage;”28 liability for 
infringement on the internet;29 and liability for acts or products that 
circumvent technological or digital locks against copying.30  
Although the basic framework of ACTA is modeled on much of 
existing U.S. law, the agreement does not track U.S. law in fine 
detail, leaving the possibility that public interest protections in U.S. 
law could be interpreted to run afoul of ACTA mandates.31 Equally 
important, ACTA exports many provisions of U.S. law that are 
subject to active debate about potentially needed revisions.32 In June 
2010, nearly 650 international intellectual property experts and 
public interest organizations from six continents adopted a sharply 
worded public statement criticizing the proposal as “hostile to the 
public interest” including in areas dealing with freedom on the 
internet; basic civil liberties including privacy and free expression; 
 
 25. See id. art. 11. 
 26. See id. arts. 12 ¶ 3, 25. 
 27. See id. arts. 13–22 (covering enforcement measures at states’ borders); see 
also id. arts. 19-20 (requiring destruction of goods after a “determination” of 
violation by a “competent authority,” which need not be a court or other body 
following strict due process norms). 
 28.  See id. art. 23 ¶ 1. 
 29. See id. art. 27. 
 30. See id. art. 27 ¶¶ 5–7. 
 31. See Memorandum from Brian T. Yeh, Legislative Attorney, Am. Law Div., 
Cong. Research Serv., to the Hon. Ron Wyden, United States Senate, Potential 
Implications for Federal Law Raised by the October 2010 Draft of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Oct. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110421/16580813994/crs-report-withheld-ustr-
confirms-that-acta-language-is-quite-questionable.shtml. 
 32. See, e.g., Paul E. Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for 
Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 165 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright 
Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. (2010), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_CPP.pdf. Compare Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy In 
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 480–97 (2009) (arguing that 
certain statutory damage awards based on existing U.S. domestic IP laws, which 
include statutory minimums, are inconsistent with due process principles), with 
ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, art. 9, ¶¶ 1, 3 (stating that when 
determining damages, authorities may consider, among other things, “the 
infringer’s profits,” “pre-established damages,” and “additional damages” in the 
case of copyright infringement). 
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free trade in generic medicines; and the policy balances between 
protection and access which lie at the heart of all intellectual 
property doctrines.33 A group of nearly 80 intellectual property law 
professors later reviewed the text of the agreement and reported: “it 
is clear that ACTA would usurp congressional authority over 
intellectual property policy in a number of ways.”34  
According to the negotiating parties, the drafting of ACTA is now 
complete and it is “ready to be submitted to the participants’ 
respective authorities to undertake relevant domestic processes.”35 
And that is where this story begins. Many of the parties negotiating 
the agreement, including the E.U., will follow the normal procedures 
for entering a treaty, including consent by the legislative branch.36 
But the United States will not. The USTR has stated repeatedly that 
ACTA will enter into force in the United States without any 
congressional action.37 Congress will not have the opportunity to 
review or amend the agreement before it goes into effect, even 
though this power would be granted in any other traditional 
 
 33. Press Release, Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop., Text of 
Urgent ACTA Communiqué: International Experts Find that Pending Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreements Threatens Public Interest (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique. 
 34. Over 75 Law Profs Call for Halt of ACTA, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & 
INTELL. PROP. (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-
post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-on-acta. 
 35. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Participants 
Finalize Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Text (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/november/us-
participants-finalize-anti-counterfeiting-trad. 
 36. See Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of 
the ACTA negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2010)0058 (2010) (resolving 
that the ACTA Treaty will not enter into force in the European Union until the 
European Parliament gives its consent). 
 37. Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-counterfeiting Agreement Raises 
Constitutional Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html (reporting 
on the Obama Administration’s intention to adopt ACTA as a sole executive 
agreement without submitting it to Congress for approval); Eddan Katz & Gwen 
Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge 
Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the 
Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements, 35 
YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 24, 27 (2009), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-
hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf. 
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international agreement binding the United States.38 USTR’s strategy 
raises the constitutional problem with ACTA: the President lacks the 
constitutional authority to bind the United States to an international 
intellectual property agreement without congressional consent.  
II. ACTA IS NOT A TREATY (UNDER U.S. LAW) 
The process that has been described by USTR for entering 
ACTA—without submitting it to Congress for ratification—is 
insufficient to bind the United States to the agreement under U.S. 
law. The definition of a “finely wrought” system for the creation of 
binding law is a core subject of the Constitution.39 That document 
has been interpreted to establish only three types of international 
agreements that can bind the United States: traditional treaties, 
confirmed by two thirds of the Senate; congressional-executive 
agreements entered under congressionally delegated authority or 
approved in legislation after the fact; and sole executive agreements 
entered under the President’s own authority. ACTA is none of these.  
A. ACTA IS NOT AN ARTICLE II TREATY 
As used in the U.S. Constitution, the term “treaty” refers to one 
way in which an international agreement becomes law. Article II, 
Section 2, gives the President the power to “make” treaties, and 
provides that such agreements become part of the supreme law of the 
United States with a two-thirds vote of the Senate.40 The USTR is not 
claiming, however, that it has any intent to ask the Senate to approve 
ACTA as a treaty. Thus, to be a binding international law under the 
U.S. Constitution, ACTA must be one of the two types of “executive 
agreements” contemplated by constitutional processes.  
 
 38. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 5 
(Committee Print 2001) (noting that in most cases “executive agreements are either 
explicitly or implicitly authorized in advance by Congress or submitted to 
Congress for approval”). 
 39. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) (discussing the Senate’s 
treaty ratification power as one of a limited set of Constitutional unicameral 
actions that have the full force of law). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
914 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
B. ACTA IS NOT A CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 
So-called “congressional-executive” agreements become binding 
law by virtue of having complied with Article I’s lawmaking 
process. Since Congress has the expressly delegated power to 
regulate foreign commerce, it can implement legal changes to 
international trade laws by statute as well as treaty.41 In a 
congressional-executive agreement, Congress passes through both 
houses, and the President signs, legislation either delegating ex ante 
authority to enter into agreements or approving the agreement itself 
ex post. Having been passed through legislation, these agreements 
become binding federal law and, for example, preempt contrary state 
legislation.42  
There is growing academic literature documenting and analyzing 
the recent shift by the United States toward the use of congressional-
executive agreements in international lawmaking.43 Academics 
debate the extent to which Congress should delegate broad authority 
to the President to make law through congressional-executive 
agreements, particularly through the vague and open ended 
delegations of ex ante authority that has become common in modern 
times.44 It is generally accepted, however, that agreements made with 
 
 41. See John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of 
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 768–71 (2001) 
(describing the historical debate over treaties infringing on statutory power). 
 42. Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1573, 1596 (2007) (stating that “congressional-executive agreements (if 
enacted as ‘Laws’) qualify as ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”). 
 43. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power 
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 548 (2004); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 
YALE L.J. 140, 149–50 (2009) (explaining that executive agreements now account 
for the great majority of international agreements entered into by the United 
States); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252–56 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking 
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1265–69 (1995); Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 
337–59 (2006); Yoo, supra note 41, at 768–71 (2001); see also CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., supra note 38. 
 44. Compare Yoo, supra note 41, at 763 (supporting congressional-executive 
agreements as a means to “[preserve] Congress’s constitutional powers over 
matters such as international commerce”), with Hathaway, supra note 43, at 146–
47 (criticizing the growth of ex ante congressional-executive agreements because 
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ex ante Congressional authorization or ex post consent are binding 
proclamations of law.45 But they are binding only because of the 
congressional action validating them.46  
ACTA is not being negotiated as a congressional-executive 
agreement. Congress has not authorized its entry ex ante and there 
are no plans to submit the agreement to Congress ex post.47 
Accordingly, to be a lawful and binding agreement under the U.S. 
Constitution, ACTA must be a valid sole executive agreement.  
C. ACTA IS NOT A SOLE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 
In a “sole executive agreement,” the President binds the United 
States to an international agreement unilaterally—with no formal ex 
ante or ex post authorization by Congress. As noted, this is the form 
of agreement that USTR has used to describe ACTA. This claim is 
dubious, however, because of the “[s]trict legal limits [that] govern 
the kinds of agreements that presidents may enter into” without some 
form of Congressional consent.48 Although ACTA may be entered by 
the President through sole executive action, it will not be a valid sole 
executive agreement merely by virtue of that fact. 
Because sole executive agreements “lack an underlying legal basis 
 
Congress grants broad executive authority to negotiate the agreements while 
reserving no further role for itself). 
 45. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 38, at 5 (stating that the 
constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements is considered “well 
established”). But see Tribe, supra note 43, at 1265–70 (describing how 
congressional-executive agreements may violate the Treaty Clause). 
 46. See Yoo, supra note 41, at 823 (“Not only are congressional-executive 
agreements acceptable, but in areas of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, they 
are—in a sense—constitutionally required.”); see also infra Part II(C)–(D). 
 47. See Sherwin Siy, The Trouble with ACTA, AM. CONST. SOC'Y BLOG (Apr. 
6, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/node/15774 (noting that ACTA will not 
require any legislative action to be implemented). Some commentators on ACTA 
have argued that it should be considered a “treaty,” which undermines the 
Administration’s argument that it is instead a “sole executive agreement” and does 
not require Congressional approval. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] 
(defining a treaty under international law as any written agreement between 
States). 
 48. See Hathaway, supra note 43, at 146 (reasoning that the principle of 
separation of powers requires that the three branches of government cooperate 
among each other before entering into broad binding international agreements). 
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in the form of a statute or treaty,”49 they can be made only by the 
President within the restrictive set of circumstances in which the 
President has independent Constitutional authority.50 “The President 
cannot make an international agreement that exceeds his own 
constitutional authority without Congress’s assent.”51 
The problem with ACTA as a sole executive agreement is that the 
regulation of its subject matter does not lie within the President’s 
own constitutional authority. Article II of the Constitution provides 
for the exercise of certain powers by the President unilaterally. Many 
executive agreements are uncontroversial extensions of the 
President’s independent authority to act as Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy;52 to receive ambassadors from, and thereby 
recognize, foreign nations;53 or to issue pardons.54 There are also a 
large number of often mundane55 executive agreements grounded in 
the President’s general power to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”56 In a small number of other borderline cases, 
such as settling foreign claims against the United States, the long 
 
 49. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 38, at 88. 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303(4) (1987) (stating that the President may enter a binding 
international agreement without congressional assent only for a “matter that falls 
within his independent powers under the Constitution”); see also Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (admonishing that when 
the President acts pursuant to an “express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum,” but “in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers”). 
 51. Declaration and Principles: Future U.S. Commitments to Iraq: Joint 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Subcomm. on Middle East and 
South Asia and Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight, 110th 
Cong. 40 (2008) (statement of Oona A. Hathaway, Professor, Yale Law School), 
available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/41061.pdf. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Hathaway, supra note 43, at 151–52 (citing 
“defense” as the area of foreign policy with the most executive agreements). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Clark, supra note 42, at 1581–82 (describing 
the “vast majority” of sole executive agreements as “unobjectionable . . . means of 
exercising [the President’s] independent statutory or constitutional powers”). 
 55. Hathaway, supra note 43 at 153 (including, for example, “‘energy-efficient 
labeling programs’ [or] air transport agreement[s]” with a foreign country). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Hathaway, supra note 43, at 154-55 n.29 
(finding approximately 375 sole executive agreements between 1990 and 2000 on 
matters including “Agreed Minutes” and “Implementing Procedures”); cf. Van 
Alstine, supra note 43, at 352 n.285 (citing over 15,000 executive agreements 
between 1946 and 2004). 
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historical practice of acquiescence by Congress has been used to 
justify sole executive action.57 Such acts, performed within the 
bounds of constitutionally delegated power, “have as much legal 
validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature.”58 
Thus, if ACTA is a valid sole executive agreement, it could preempt 
contrary state law59 and otherwise operate as federal law.60  
None of these categories of valid sole executive agreements apply 
to ACTA. If ACTA was composed only of the kind of coordination 
and information exchange between customs offices contained in its 
Chapter IV, perhaps it could be justified as incident to the President’s 
executive power to manage agencies in their implementation of law. 
But ACTA’s information sharing and international cooperation 
mandates amount to only a few of its pages.61 As described above, 
the majority of ACTA consists of specific provisions on intellectual 
property remedies and enforcement procedures to which the 
 
 57. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 38, at 90; Clark, supra note 42 at 
1582, 1615, 1660 (noting that the practice of settling claims through executive 
agreements began over 200 years ago). 
 58. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
No. 64, (John Jay) (Independent Journal, 1788)) (describing the equal legal validity 
of “[a]ll Constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial 
department”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 38, at 92 (“Sole executive 
agreements validly concluded pursuant to one or more of the President’s 
independent powers under Article II of the Constitution may be accorded status as 
Supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 59. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-17 (2003) 
(recognizing that an executive agreement may preempt otherwise permissible state 
laws given the concern for uniformity in dealing with foreign nations). 
 60. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 38, at 95 (acknowledging that 
while a sole executive agreement within the President’s constitutional authority has 
been held as valid federal law, “the question as to the effect of a Presidential 
agreement upon a prior conflicting act of Congress has apparently not yet been 
completely settled”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115 Reporter’s Note 5 (1987) (explaining that constitutional acts, whether done 
by the executive, judicial or legislative branch, have the same legal status as 
federal law but could supersede one another depending on the circumstances). But 
see United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659-60 (4th Cir. 1953), 
aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (“[W]hatever the power of the 
executive with respect to making executive trade agreements regulating foreign 
commerce in the absence of action by Congress, it is clear that the executive may 
not through entering into such an agreement avoid complying with a regulation 
prescribed by Congress.’’). 
 61. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, arts. 28-35. 
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legislation of each country must adhere. This cannot be justified as 
implementation of mere executive power. “In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”62  
The USTR claim that ACTA can be a valid sole executive 
agreement lacks a justifying theory of law. Notably, this course of 
action is not justified by the logic of the controversial claims to 
executive authority during the George W. Bush administration.63 
Those in favor of strong executive power to suspend treaty 
provisions, prosecute the war on terror, and otherwise conduct 
foreign affairs without congressional oversight argue from a premise 
of unenumerated powers. The essence of the argument is that the 
structure and history of our Constitution indicate that all 
unenumerated powers in matters of foreign affairs should vest in the 
sole discretion of the executive.64 But these arguments for expanded 
executive power apply only where the powers at issue are 
unenumerated.65 Even adherents to the strong executive theory accept 
that the President cannot use a sole executive agreement to bind the 
United States to international law in any area expressly delegated to 
Congress by Article I.66 As an agreement setting minimum legislative 
 
 62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
 63. See Van Alstine, supra note 43, at 312 n.8 (suggesting the Bush 
Administration’s increasing use of executive authority to act unilaterally was due 
to national security concerns over international terrorism); Bradley & Flaherty, 
supra note 43, at 546-48 (tracing the rise in popularity in recent years of the 
“Vesting Clause Thesis,” which argues for expansive executive authority, to the 
state of foreign affairs since September 11, 2001). 
 64. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & 
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, on Authority of the President to Suspend 
Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, to John Bellinger, Senior Assoc. Counsel to 
the President and Legal Adviser to the Nat'l Sec. Council 13 (Nov. 15, 2001), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf (stating 
that “the executive exercises all unenumerated powers related to treaty making”); 
see also Van Alstine, supra note 43, at 337-40 (describing the strong claim that 
Article II’s “vesting clause” grants plenary powers to the President over foreign 
affairs); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 
1677-78 (2002) (arguing that enumerating powers to the executive was not 
intended to limit the scope of authority granted by the vesting clause). 
 65. See Louis Henkin, “A More Effective System” for Foreign Relations: The 
Constitutional Framework, 61 VA. L. REV. 751, 753 (1975) (“The uncertainties 
and the sources of controversy about the constitutional blueprint lie in what the 
Constitution does not say.”) (emphasis added). 
 66. See Yoo, supra note 41, at 823-25 (arguing that “the political branches 
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standards for intellectual property law and the regulation of IP-
protected goods on the internet and in foreign commerce, ACTA 
directly implicates Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”67 There is no residuum of power in these 
areas that the executive can claim.  
D. USTR’S JUSTIFICATIONS DO NOT ESTABLISH ACTA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AS A SOLE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 
The USTR has made three assertions justifying entering ACTA as 
a sole executive agreement despite the lack of plenary authority of 
the President over its subject matter. In off-the-record meetings and 
briefings, USTR has argued that a sole executive agreement is an 
appropriate method for implementation of ACTA because:  
(1) the agreement will be consistent with existing U.S. law;68  
(2) the President has “plenary” powers over foreign affairs; and  
(3) the President is authorized by virtue of the Trade Act of 1974.  
None of these arguments establish an adequate constitutional basis 
for sole executive action on ACTA. 
The consistency of ACTA with current U.S. law does not justify 
its entry as a sole executive agreement. Factually, it is not true that 
ACTA avoids usurpations of congressional authority. As noted in a 
letter of 80 law professors to President Obama, ACTA “fail[s] to 
 
must use a statute to implement, at the domestic level, any international agreement 
that involves economic affairs,” including “matters such as international and 
interstate commerce [and] intellectual property”); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 
43, at 253 (clarifying that the President’s foreign affairs powers do not encompass 
the powers specifically allocated to the Congress or Senate); see also Van Alstine, 
supra note 43, at 342-43 (“[E]ven the strong claim to implied executive powers 
acknowledges, as it must, that the president’s Article II powers are ‘residual’ only. 
Whatever their general scope, they are qualified by, and otherwise must yield to, 
the more specific allocations of power elsewhere in Article II and in Article I.”). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 68. See The President’s 2011 Trade Agenda: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On 
Finance, 112th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of the Hon. Ronald Kirk, United 
States Trade Rep.), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RonKirk 
_SFC_9Mar2011.pdf.  
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explicitly incorporate current congressional policy” in a number of 
key areas.69 Likewise, a study by the Congressional Research Service 
concluded that “[d]epending on how broadly or narrowly several 
passages from the ACTA draft text are interpreted, it appears that 
certain provisions of federal intellectual property law could be 
regarded as inconsistent with ACTA.”70  
Even assuming that ACTA was entirely consistent with current 
U.S. law, that fact would not justify the entry of the United States 
into it as a sole executive agreement. If ACTA is not binding, then it 
needs to be entered as a “memorandum of understanding” or other 
form that withholds any U.S. intent to be bound. For the question of 
whether the Administration can enter ACTA through an 
internationally binding sole executive agreement, the issue of its 
compliance with present U.S. law is irrelevant. If valid, the 
agreement would subject the United States to international remedies 
for changing its law in a way inconsistent with the agreement. 
Although this may not technically prohibit Congress from making 
such changes, this is true with any internationally binding agreement. 
Congress could only change the law outside of the bounds of the 
agreement in violation of international law. Under our Constitution, 
the President cannot tie Congress’s hands in this way any more than 
the Congress can pass legislation without the President’s signature.  
USTR’s second argument—that the President has plenary power 
to enter into international intellectual property agreements—is 
similarly misplaced. Here, USTR is drawing on a host of Supreme 
Court statements that the President sometimes acts as the “sole” or 
“exclusive” representative of the United States in the arena of foreign 
affairs.71 The specific source of USTR’s rhetoric appears to be the 
 
 69. Over 75 Law Profs Call for Halt of ACTA, supra note 34.  
 70. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALD-7-5182, POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAW RAISED BY THE OCTOBER 2010 DRAFT OF THE 
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) (2010), available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110421/16580813994/crs-report-withheld-ustr-
confirms-that-acta-language-is-quite-questionable.shtml. 
 71. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 741 (1971) (“[I]t 
is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary 
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander 
in Chief.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (discussing the 
“conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively 
responsible”); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 
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oft-cited dicta of the Supreme Court in the Curtiss-Wright case, 
referring to the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.”72  
Properly placed in context, the description of the President as the 
“sole” and “plenary” voice in foreign affairs is undoubtedly true. The 
President appoints U.S. representatives to international lawmaking 
institutions including the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organization. In 
these capacities, and under the President’s power to make treaties 
and represent the United States, the executive branch regularly 
engages in the creation of international law and policy.73 The relevant 
distinction, however, is between the role of the President as the voice 
and negotiator of the United States in foreign relations, which the 
executive holds unilaterally, and the President’s ability to bind the 
United States to internationally constructed laws and policies, where 
the “constitutional power over foreign affairs is shared by Congress 
and the President.”74 The external agreements negotiated by 
presidential appointees in service of foreign policy goals do not bind 
the United States except in the strictly limited areas where the 
President has sole Constitutional authority.75 Because ACTA 
involves international legal obligations covered by Congress’ powers 
enumerated by Article I, Section 8, the President cannot bind the 
United States to the agreement absent congressional consent.  
 
(1948) (describing the President as “the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs”). 
 72. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 73. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Nor is there any 
question generally that that there is executive authority to decide what 
[international] policy should be.”). 
 74. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85 (1993) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds); see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 
261-62 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the President and Congress 
together have a responsibility to determine the state of our nation’s foreign affairs); 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (discussing the “field of foreign 
affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress”); United 
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 201 (1926) (“Under the Constitution the treaty-
making power resides in the President and Senate, and when through their action a 
treaty is made and proclaimed it becomes a law of the United States.”). 
 75. See Van Alstine, supra note 43, at 345 (“[T]he president requires the 
consent of Congress as a whole, or two-thirds of the Senate for treaties, to 
transform this external policy into domestic law.”). 
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Finally, USTR evokes the Trade Act of 1974 as an example of ex 
ante authorization for the President to negotiate trade agreements.76 
This argument would be cogent if fast track legislation was still in 
effect. Fast track legislation was a delegation of Congress’s authority 
to regulate international trade to the executive branch under 
circumscribed rules, but which still required a final up or down vote 
by Congress.77 That legislation has lapsed. The Trade Act of 1974 
does not itself delegate power to the President to bind the United 
States to trade agreements absent congressional consent. ACTA—no 
different from the Trans-Pacific Partnership now being negotiated or 
the Korea, Panama, and Peru free trade agreements the 
Administration is seeking to conclude—must be approved by 
Congress as a regulation of foreign commerce regardless of whether 
it complies with current law.78  
III. ACTA IS A TREATY (UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW) 
The above discussion might lead the layman, or even the lay-
lawyer, to conclude that ACTA’s existence as an unconstitutional 
sole executive agreement means that the agreement can have no legal 
effect on or in the United States. This conclusion is wrong, however, 
because international law operates under a different set of norms for 
identifying binding law than does the U.S. Constitution. 
As used in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and in 
customary international law, a “treaty” means any “international 
agreement concluded between [two] States in written form and 
governed by international law.”79 An international agreement is 
generally considered a treaty, and is binding on the parties, if: 
1.The parties intend the agreement to be binding; 
2.The agreement deals with significant matters; 
 
 76. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
 77. See Hathaway, supra note 43, at 264-65 (noting that, under fast track 
authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation with minimal debate, mandatory 
deadlines, and no amendments). 
 78. See, e.g., United States – Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., 
June 28, 2007 (pending Congressional approval), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa. 
 79. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 2(1)(a). 
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3.The agreement clearly and specifically describes the legal 
obligations of the parties; and  
4.The form indicates an intention to conclude the treaty.80 
The final three factors are clearly met in ACTA. The agreement 
contains numerous specific and significant requirements for domestic 
legal regulation bound into the form of a binding trade agreement.81 
With regard to the intent of the parties to be bound, the agreement 
itself signals such an intent, requiring that “[e]ach Party shall give 
effect to the provisions of this Agreement.”82 Thus, for the United 
States, the last remaining question is whether the United States can 
state an intent to be bound to an international agreement through a 
process (executive consent alone) that the Constitution does not 
permit. 
International law determines the legal effect of international 
agreements. Although the President cannot make domestic law 
without Congress, he can, generally, unilaterally bind the United 
States under international law. This norm is an incidence of the 
international law principle that every state has the capacity to 
conclude international agreements and that heads of state are 
presumptively authorized to represent a state for purposes of 
concluding an international agreement.83 It is also a commonly 
accepted principle that a country “may not invoke a violation of its 
internal law to vitiate its consent to be bound” internationally.84 
As an international agreement between the negotiating parties, 
ACTA would bind all signatories to abide by its framework.85 Parties 
 
 80. Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States 
Senate. S-Prt. 103-53 (1993).  
 81. See, e.g., ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, pmbl. (describing the 
intent of parties). 
 82. Id. art. 2(1). 
 83. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 6, 7; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 311 (1987); 
Van Alstine, supra note 43, at n.62 (“Under international law, the president, except 
in extreme circumstances, has the authority to bind the United States even where 
he exceeds his domestic constitutional authority.”). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 311(3); accord Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 46 (noting that 
the violation of internal law must be “manifest” and concern a rule of 
“fundamental importance” to evade obligations under international law). 
 85. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, art. 2 ¶ 1 (stating that 
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to an international agreement with binding obligations must not 
derogate from its obligations and must perform them in good faith. 
This doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) 
lies at the core of the law of international agreements and is 
embodied in the Vienna Convention.86 It implies the existence of 
international obligations that must be performed in good faith despite 
restrictions imposed by domestic law.87 Accordingly, even though 
ACTA may not be enforceable domestically, it will nonetheless be a 
binding international agreement and the parties, including the United 
States, must perform its obligations in good faith. 
The existence of a binding obligation in international law leaves 
parties free to decide how to implement it in domestic law, a concept 
reflected in the December draft of ACTA.88 However, if the United 
States decides that it does not need to take any action to implement 
ACTA domestically, then it is up to the other contracting parties to 
identify and pursue the reconciliation of any discrepancies between 
ACTA and U.S. law. 
Currently, ACTA lacks a forum for enforcement or dispute 
resolution. But that hole in ACTA does not mean the agreement 
lacks binding effect. “Under international law, a state that has 
violated a legal obligation to another state is required to terminate the 
violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in appropriate 
circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury.”89 In 
order to resolve disputes, “[a] state may bring a claim against another 
state for a violation of an international obligation . . . either through 
 
“[e]ach Party shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 301(1) (defining “international agreement” as “an agreement between two or 
more states . . . that is intended to be legally binding and is governed by 
international law”). 
 86. See Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 26; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321. 
 87. See Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 27 (stating that “[a] party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 321, cmt. a (explaining that “international obligations 
survive restrictions imposed by domestic law”). 
 88. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 18, art. 2 ¶ 1 (giving each party 
the ability to “determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions”). 
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 901. 
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diplomatic channels” or an agreed procedure.90 A party asserting that 
the United States is in breach of its international obligations under 
ACTA may resort to countermeasures under customary international 
law.91 Through these measures, other parties may punish violations 
of ACTA by imposing trade sanctions or other penalties against U.S. 
commerce, provided such punitive acts are proportional in relation to 
the breach.92 Another party could also litigate a case against the 
United States in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),93 but that 
would require the United States to submit to ICJ jurisdiction.94  
Furthermore, ACTA’s legal status under international law could 
alter U.S. law, even without congressional ratification. As valid 
international law, U.S. courts may use ACTA to interpret ambiguous 
commands in U.S. domestic law.95 The State Department and USTR 
would presumably review and craft subsequent international 
agreements, including those intended to bind U.S. law, to ensure 
compliance with ACTA. Pressure from industry and the 
Administration may be brought to bear on Congress and the states to 
change their laws, or refrain from future revisions, to comply with 
ACTA’s mandates.96 Indeed, because the question of whether ACTA 
 
 90. Id. § 902(1). 
 91. See G.A. Res. 56/83, arts. 12-15, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
 92. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 792 (2001) (providing examples of cases where WTO sanctions were 
utilized, but arguing that their imposition rarely ends the dispute or remedies state 
non-compliance). 
 93. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 94. See Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice: How Compulsory Is it?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L LAW 
29, 29 (2006) (noting that if a state consents to the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice they must answer any disputes submitted to the Court). 
 95. See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 
(1804) (acknowledging the modernizing world and recognizing that individuals are 
not only ruled by municipal laws or ordinances, but also by the “laws of nations”). 
The “Charming Betsy” convention of statutory interpretation holds that U.S. courts 
should construe congressional statutes as consistent with U.S. international 
obligations, whenever possible. 
 96. This is an example of “policy laundering” that has become quite common 
in international intellectual property law. See Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy 
Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA 
Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 128 (2006) (defining 
policy laundering as “a term that describes efforts by policy actors to have policy 
initiatives seen as exogenously determined, or even seen as requirements imposed 
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is a valid sole executive agreement is unlikely to be subject to 
challenge by courts under the political question doctrine,97 it could 
have the practical effect of a valid sole executive agreement, 
including preemption of state law. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many substantive problems with ACTA from the 
perspective of what U.S. intellectual property and technology policy 
should be. Many of those problems can be traced back to the 
fundamental process flaw described in this article. The sole executive 
agreement model insulates USTR from the normal congressional 
oversight processes necessary to make binding international law. It 
therefore has created a kind of public policy moral hazard. Whereas 
an economic moral hazard is said to exist where insurance or some 
other factor “cushion[s] the consequences of bad behavior, [which] . 
. . encourage[s] that bad behavior,”98 the sole executive agreement 
model cushions USTR from congressional and public oversight, 
which encourages bad policymaking. This was not the process the 
founders intended. The founders established constitutional 
requirements so that the people’s representatives would have a strong 
and central role in the approval of any international agreement that 
impacts domestic regulatory authority. Such a process strives to 
encourage balanced lawmaking by ensuring that a broad array of 
stakeholders will be represented in decision making. By designing a 
procedure for the approval of ACTA outside of the finely wrought 
constitutional process, the current and prior Administrations have 
been able to insulate themselves from normal democratic channels. 
This bold course of action charts new ground that will likely be 
replicated by future Administrations—unless the other branches of 
government call for a halt to this unconstitutional process. 
 
by powerful others”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data 
Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 786-87 (2009) (suggesting that the use of 
“policy laundering” attempts to change the focus of the policy debate from the 
effects of the policy on the American people to whether the failure to adopt the 
policy would strain international relations). 
 97. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.2d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to review whether NAFTA was unconstitutionally entered by executive 
agreement rather than through an Art. II treaty). 
 98. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 237-
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